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Abstract:
The supply of deceased donor organs is a limiting factor for transplantation based therapies.
This research utilizes a laboratory experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative public
policies targeted at increasing the rate of deceased donor organ donation. The experiment
includes treatments across different default choices (opt-in versus opt-out) and organ allocation
rules (without versus with priority rule) inspired by the donor registration systems applied in
different countries. Furthermore, the experiment includes a controlled treatment to measure the
effects of a neutral versus descriptive framing of the decision task. Our results indicate that the
opt-out system with priority rule generates the largest increase in organ donation relative to an
opt-in only program. However, sizeable gains are achievable using either a priority rule or optout program separately, with the opt-out rule generating approximately 80% of the benefits
achieved under a priority rule program.
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Between 2000 and 2009 the annual number of deceased organ donors within the United States
(U.S.) increased from 5,985 to 8,022 (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) 2012).
Although this represents a 34% increase in deceased donors, it has not kept pace with the rapidly
risen waiting list. During this same time interval the number of patients waiting for an organ
transplant has increased from 74,635 to 111,027 patients, a 49% increase (SRTR 2012). Both in
absolute and relative terms there is an ever increasing gap between the number of deceased
donor organs and those waiting for a transplant. 1 Despite the large need for transplantable
organs, only 42.7% of residents in the U.S. over the age of 18 are registered organ donors.2
Clearly, the current organ supply system in the United States fails to produce an adequate supply
to satisfy the demand for transplantable organs and there is an increasing need to close this gap
and increase human welfare. In this paper we experimentally investigate whether or not changes
in the organ donation default choices as well as organ allocations can effectively increase organ
donation and facilitate the closing of this gap.
The experimental design is inspired by different donor registration and organ allocation
systems currently applied in other countries.

The U.S. system serves as a baseline for

comparison where current donor registration is an opt-in program and the organ allocation
system does not assign priority to those who are willing to be donors themselves. We compare
this institution to an opt-out donor registration system inspired by the current system in Spain
and Austria, an opt-in with a priority allocation rule inspired by Israel and an opt-out with
priority rule system inspired by Singapore. Our results indicate that the opt-out system with
priority rule generates the largest donation rates, with the largest marginal gains arising from the
priority rule allocation system. Our results are consistent with the findings of Kessler and Roth
(2012) who found that a priority rule allocation program will increase donation rates, but we
complement their finding to encompass the opt-out rule which is currently being utilized in other
countries.
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It is worth noting that the reported deaths while in the waiting list per 1,000 patient years at risks has decreased

from 104.6 in 2000 to 84.5 in 2009 (SRTR 2012). This is primarily due the advancements in care for these patients
and not a function of increased transplantation.
2

Based on the 2012 National Donor Designation Report Card by the Donate Life America at

http://donatelife.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/DLA-Report-Card-2012-350781.pdf
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Although there are a large number of living donors within the U.S., there is currently 0.8
living donors for each deceased donor, we focus on deceased donation as the number of potential
deceased donors is far above the number of current deceased donors and many types of organ
transplantation rely exclusively on deceased donation.3 Approaches to increase the organ supply
from deceased donation broadly fall into two classes: improving the donation rates of eligible
deceased donors and enlarging the pool of potential donors. The donation rates can be improved
by increasing the consent rates from the potential donors’ next-of-kin. Since first drafted in 1968,
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) provides that an individual’s statement of intent to be
an organ donor is legally binding (Bonnie et al., 2008). However, it is still common practice to
ask the permission of the deceased’s next-of-kin to donate their organs. Along this vein, the
department of Health and Human Service (HHS) passed regulation that requires all hospitals to
report all deaths to the Organ Procurement Organization (OPO).4 This regulation increases the
opportunity that the deceased’s next-of-kin is contacted for organ donation.
Policymakers have made efforts to increase the donation rate through regulation and
improvements to the organ procurement system. In the U.S. an organ procurement organization
(OPO) is in charge of the procurement of deceased-donor organs.

There are 58 such

organizations from different regions throughout the U.S. and each regional OPO obtains direct
contact with the deceased’s next-of-kin. In April 2003, HHS launched the Organ Donation
Breakthrough Collaborative to improve the donation rate.5 The goal of the collaborative is to
encourage adoption of “best practices” for increasing access to transplantable organs. Recent
research suggests that the collaborative has increased organ donation within the U.S. (Howard et
al., 2007; Shafer et al., 2008).
Another approach to increase the organ supply is to enlarge the pool of potential donors or
generating a higher registration rate among the population. Our experiment is targeted at this
3

While a live donor can give a kidney, or a portion of the liver, lung, intestine, or pancreas, it is essentially

impossible for live donation of solid organs such as the heart, pancreas, and intestinal organs.
4

This policy was announced in June 1998. HHS Announcement: http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/980617

.html
5

The Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative began in 2003 at the request of HHS Secretary Tommy G.

Thompson.
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mechanism for increasing the organ supply as we measure the relative effectiveness of potential
policy changes that target increasing the number of potential donors. Our paper is novel in that
we conduct a controlled lab experiment to compare policy regimes with different institutions
surrounding organ donation registration that currently exist in the world today. Results from the
experiment will inform the discussion of possible changes in public policy towards organ
donation. We consider two highly publicized proposals: changing the default of organ donation
registration and changing the organ allocation rule.
Changing the default option affects decision-making.

Economists have highlighted the

substantial role that defaults play in numerous areas, including health care plans (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988), automobile insurance (Johnson et al., 1993), retirement saving plans
(Madrian and Shea, 2001) and consent to online privacy policies (Johnson et al., 2002). Results
show that people often choose the default option to which they are assigned, suggesting that
changing the default choice of the organ donation question may influence donation decisions.
The U.S. operates an opt-in policy regime so that the individual must self-select and register to
be an organ donor. In other words, the current default choice in the U.S. is non-donor. One
proposed policy alternative is to change the default option to being a donor, what is referred to as
an opt-out system. Under an opt-out regime, an individual must self-select out of being an organ
donor.
Altering the default choice influences donation decisions through various channels (Johnson
and Goldstein, 2003). First, the default may be considered as the recommended action by the
policy-maker. For example, if the default is that an individual has consented to be a donor,
potential donors might believe being a donor is recommended by policy-makers.

Second,

accepting the default may involve less effort for the individual making decisions.
Psychologically, the organ donation decision may induce stress from thoughts of dying or pain
suffered by family members should their organs be donated. Researching the information about
organ donation and filling out registration forms also involves time and physical effort. These
costs are upfront burdens placed upon organ donation registration and intensified when the
default option is non-donor (captured by the opt-in rule within our experiment).

4

Several European countries like Spain and Austria have adopted an opt-out system for organ
donation, while some other European countries like Germany and the United Kingdom have optin default options. Using data reported in Gäbel (2002), Johnson and Goldstein (2003; 2004)
compare donation registration rates across European countries with different default options.
They find that the default has a large impact with opt-out countries having higher registration
rates.

One potential problem of this method is the assumption that all other observable

characteristics can be controlled for and unobservable characteristics are not correlated with
donation registration across countries. We provide support for these empirical results using a
laboratory setting where outside confounders do not exist.
Changing the organ allocation rule is another potential way to increase the pool of registered
donors. The current organ allocation system in U.S. is organized by the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS). UNOS maintains a national waiting list. Transplant candidates on the
list are ranked, among other things, according to the candidate’s health condition, physical
compatibility between the donor and the candidate (i.e., the Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)
matching),6 their distance from the potential donor, the patient’s preferences for particular donor
types (i.e., is the patient willing to accept an Extended Criteria Donor (ECD) organ) and how
long the candidate has been on the waiting list. When a transplantable organ becomes available,
the opportunity goes to the highest-ranked person on the list. Under the current allocation
system utilized by UNOS an individual is not given priority if they have elected to be a potential
donor. A proposed change is to utilize a priority rule for allocation.7
A priority rule allocation system gives individuals who are on the organ waiting list and are
registered organ donors precedence for transplantable organs. In other words, the priority rule
establishes the top criterion for ranking on the waiting list by whether a person is registered as an
organ donor or not. Individuals who are registered donors rank higher on the waiting list than
those who are not, despite their medical condition or other differences. The supporters of the
priority rule believe that the current organ allocation system in the U.S. does not provide enough
incentive for organ donation by purely relying on altruism. The priority rule motivates an
6

A zero HLA mismatch with a particular donor will automatically move a patient up the waiting queue.
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The final decision to utilize an organ is made by the transplant surgeon. However, changes in the allocation

mechanism will alter the distribution of organ offers.
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individual to donate by connecting the potential of helping others to the potential of helping
one’s self. The results from our experiment validate this motivation.
Israel and Singapore are examples of countries that have adopted a priority rule for their
national donation system. Israel has been using the priority rule system since 2010 (Lavee et al.,
2010).8 However, Israeli citizens need to elect to be included as a registered donor to receive
priority over those not willing to be donors. Singapore passed the Human Organ Transplant Act
(HOTA) in 1987, which applies the priority rule with an opt-out system.9 In Singapore, citizens
are assumed to be organ donors, but any person who objects to HOTA can elect not to be
included. If a person objects to donate his organs upon death, he automatically gives up priority
for receiving an organ should they need one in future.

Therefore, the policy currently

implemented in Singapore combines all the features that may increase organ donation over the
current U.S. paradigm.
Our experimental design complements the recent work of Kessler and Roth (2012). Kessler
and Roth design a laboratory experiment to test for changes in the decision to register as a donor
from alterations in allocation rule (i.e., priority rule) and the using of financial incentives (i.e., a
rebate and discount). As mentioned earlier, Kessler and Roth illustrate that organ donation rates
will increase if one elects to utilize a priority rule for organ allocation. Our research extends this
research in two important dimensions. One, we investigate whether or not the results expressed
in Kessler and Roth (2012) are a construct of the neutral framing used in their experiment as the
terms organ and organ donation are not used. Secondly, we investigate whether or not the
utilization of an opt-out versus an opt-in decision rule combined with a priority and no priority
rule can yield further increases in organ donation. The later being extremely important as it
investigates the marginal effects of other countries policies on the organ donation decision.

8

The new organ allocation policy was first suggested to the Israel National Transplant Council (INTC) in 2006. It

was put into effect in January 2010. The new policy can be found as the Organ Transplant Law 5768-2008, Israeli
Book of Laws (English translation provided by the Israeli Ministry of Justice).
9

Details of the Human Organ Transplant Act can be found at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;

page=0;query=DocId%3Adb05e985-f8a0-4d61-a906-9fd39f3b5ac9%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A02%2F01%
2F2011%20TransactionTime%3A31%2F07%2F2005%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0;whole=yes
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Our research can be used to further inform the policy debate surrounding the current organ
donation system. We not only compare the alternative policies (opt-out and priority allocation
rule) to the current U.S. donation system, but we also test the relative effectiveness of different
alternative policies in an effort to decompose their marginal effects. In addition, we further
evaluate the combination of the opt-out and priority allocation rule. The opt-out with priority
system, as discussed by Breyer and Kliemt (2007) and utilized by Singapore, provides a dualincentive for donation: avoiding the cost of opting-out and receiving priority on the waiting list.
A concern with combining the opt-out and priority allocation system is that the priority rule
cannot prevent the free-rider problem if the introduction of opt-out system already generated
sufficient organ supply (Breyer and Kliemt 2007). Investigating this using observational data
would be infeasible but within our experiment we can investigate whether or not this concern is
valid. Our result suggests that the combination of opt-out and priority rule is significantly more
effective in increasing registration rates than each of the other policies.
An additional advancement we make is that the instructions to subjects in our experiment are
stated in terms of organs. The framing choice that should be applied in the experimental study of
policy evaluation is controversial. The reason we choose descriptive framing here is that we
believe the organ donation decision involves significant psychological issues and costs that
cannot be captured by abstract terms. To measure the impact of framing on experimentallyobserved donation decision, we included an additional treatment, in which the instructions are
stated in abstract terms. By doing this, we are able to discuss the impact on the decision to
donate ‘tokens’ or donate ‘organs’. Our results indicate that our findings are robust to the
framing of the experiment.
In the following section, we present our behavioral hypotheses. In Section Two, we outline
the experimental design we utilize to investigate our hypotheses on the impact that the opt-out
versus opt-in and priority allocation rule have on the organ donation decision. In Section Three
we discuss the results from the experiment and in the final section we summarize our findings.
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I. Behavioral Hypotheses
We designed an incentivized laboratory experiment to evaluate the relative effectiveness of
different organ donation mechanisms. We adopted a two-by-two design illustrated in Table 1
with the dimensions being the opt-in versus opt-out decision rule combined with the presence or
absence of the priority allocation rule.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The Control treatment models the current status quo of the U.S. donation system, where
subjects are non-donors by default and no one is granted priority for being a registered donor.
The Opt-out treatment is different from the Control treatment only in the default choice of the
donation decision.

As we discussed, there are costs associated with making active organ

donation decision. In our experiment, we model these costs as a simple monetary cost, which is
charged if a subject deviates from the default. Being an organ donation in the Opt-out treatment
is less costly than in the Control treatment. This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice of the donation decision from optin to opt-out increases the donation registration rate.
The only difference between the Control treatment and the Priority treatment is the organ
allocation rule. In the Priority treatment, subjects who are registered donors receive priority
when they need an organ, while non-donors are only able to access available organs when the
needs of the registered donors on the waiting list are satisfied. Under the priority rule, donors
can jump in front of non-donors on the waiting list. That is, the priority rule increases the
probability that donors who need an organ will receive one if they are registered donors. This
leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, changing the organ allocation rule by adding donors’ priority
increases the donation registration rate.
In addition to comparing each alternative mechanism with the current status quo, we are also
interested in the relative effectiveness of changing the default choice and changing the organ
allocation rule. More formally, we test the following hypothesis:
8

Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, changing the current status quo to the opt-out system yields
the same level of increase in the donation rate as changing to the priority rule system.
The Opt-out with Priority treatment combines the effect of changing both the default choice
(reducing the cost of donation registration) and changing the organ allocation rule (increasing the
benefit of donation). It would be expected that the dual-incentives working congruently will be
more effective than in the singular case. There is some concern, however, that if the change to
an opt-out default choice increases donation registration significantly such that individuals are
gaining very little from the priority allocation rule, then the combination of the policies may not
result in higher donation rates. In this case, the dual-incentives will not be more effective. We
test the following hypothesis on the combination of the opt-out and priority allocation rule:
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice and the organ allocation rule
together generates the same level of increase in donation registration rate as changing only one
of them.
The framing of the decision task may impact the decision to be donor or not within the
experiment. An additional advantage of our experiments is the ability to formally investigate the
framing effect. We conducted an additional treatment, a neutral framing of the Control treatment
(opt-in combined without priority), to investigate the impact that our contextual framing of the
decision process had on subject behavior. This generates our last research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, subjects behave the same when the experiment is framed in
abstract terms as when the experiment is framed in term of organs.

II. Experimental Design
There were 30 rounds in each session of the experiment and a finite number of periods in each
round. Subjects were unaware of the number of rounds, but they were informed at the beginning
of the experiment that only one round would be randomly selected to be paid at the end of the
experiment. Each subject was a virtual human in the lab who had one A organ and two B
organs. 10 In each period, subjects had a 10% probability of an A organ failure and a 20%
10

Kessler and Roth (2012) have the design of one A units with two B units, where A represents brain and B
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probability of a B organ failure (both B organs fail together).11 If a subject encountered an A
organ failure, she ceased to participate in that round. Whenever a subject’s B organs failed, she
was placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated by another subject. 12 Subjects
waiting for a B organ were not subjected to the probability of an A organ failure. Each subject
with a B organ failure had up to 5 periods to stay on the waiting list. If she did not receive a B
organ within this time period, she ceased to participate in that round.
At the beginning of each round, subjects were asked to make a decision about whether they
wanted to register as an organ donor (the opt-in rule) or withdraw from the donor registry (the
opt-out rule). Since we only focus on the donation registration decision not the procurement
process, we utilized a strong version of donation in our experiment, in which registering as a
donor implies being a donor upon death in the experiment.
Subjects were told that they would earn $3 in each period that they had one active A organ
and at least one active B organ. However, subjects were not able to earn any money when they
were on the waiting list or no longer actively participating in the round. All donation decisions
were made at the beginning of each period before knowing whether or not they would have an
organ failure. All subjects were told that if they chose to be a donor and their A organ failed first
each of their B organs would be donated to one of the subjects who were on the waiting list in
that period. However, if their B organs failed first, their active A organ could not be donated. In
addition, if they received a B organ from others, the donated B organ could not be donated again.
There were costs involved with the donation decision.13 Subjects were told that they had to
pay $0.75 to make an active donation decision (override the default choice). This cost can be
thought as the psychological and physical costs associate with overriding the default choice,

represents kidney. We keep the consistent design so that the results of our experiment are comparable.
11

These parameters are identical to those have been used by Kessler and Roth (2012). We also conducted additional

sensitivity analyses, discussed in Appendix A, specific to our design to ensure they are appropriate.
12

The assumption here is that a subject can function normally with one B organ donated by another subject.

13

Obviously, these costs associated with organ donation cannot be measured. Here we impose these costs merely to

model the incentives involved in organ donation. Since the costs vary as the default choice changes, we divide the
costs into two parts, the cost of overriding the default and the cost of donation act.
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which was charged regardless of the donation outcome. Subjects were also told that the act of
donating organs would cost them $2.25. This donation cost can be thought as the psychological
costs of organ procurement. Thus, one’s payoff for each round is equal to the earnings in that
round minus the costs they incurred for overriding the default decision as well as donating
organs. At the end of the experiment, only one round was randomly selected for payment.
Subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment that if in the selected round their payoff
was negative, the extra costs would be charged from their $10 show-up fee.
After making the donation decision at the beginning of each round, subjects observed their
outcome for each period, their earnings of each period, and their accumulated earnings for that
round. After experiencing a B organ failure, the subject began to receive the waiting list
information. The waiting list information provide subjects with information on how many
periods they had been waiting, their rank on the waiting list and whether they received a B organ
in that period. A screenshot of the information screen presented to the subjects is shown in
Figure 1. Subjects who ceased to participate in the round were not able to observe any more
information until a new round started.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
To investigate our five experimental hypotheses we conducted four organ-framed
treatments ― the Control treatment, the Opt-out treatment, the Priority treatment and the Optout with Priority treatment ― and one neutral-framed treatment. In the following, we provide
more detail on the five different treatments used in the experiment.
Control Treatment
In this treatment, subjects were not organ donors by default. Those who wished to register as
donors were charged $0.75 to change their status. Subjects were told that being an organ donor
might potentially affect others’ earnings. The donation decision was described in the experiment
as follows:
“In this round, you are not an organ donor by default. If you want to
change your status to be a donor, please check the box below;
otherwise, please leave it empty.
11

□ I hereby agree to donate my organs after I cease to participate in
this round.”
Subjects were also told that if they chose to be an organ donor, after their A organ failed,
their active B organs would be donated to those in need in the order of their rank on the waiting
list. The rank on the waiting list was determined by the length of time the subjects had been
waiting for a B organ. Subjects who had been waiting longer were ranked higher. The rank of
subjects who had the same waiting time was randomly determined. For example, if there were
two subjects on the waiting list and subject 1 had been waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 had
been waiting for 3 periods, subject 1 ranked higher than subject 2.
Opt-out Treatment
In the Opt-out treatment, subjects were registered organ donors by default. Those who
wished to withdraw their donor registry were charged $0.75 to opt out. The choice of this
treatment was described as follows:
“In this round, you are an organ donor by default. If you want to
change your status to be a non-donor, please check the box below;
otherwise, please leave it empty.

□ I hereby object to donate my organs after I cease to participate in
this round.”
Unless a subject responded that he or she did not want to be considered a potential organ
donor, their active B organs were donated after an A organ failure occurred. Organs were
provided to those in need according to their rank on the waiting list. Subjects on the waiting list
were ranked by the length of time they had been waiting on the list, and subjects who had been
waiting longer were ranked higher.
Priority Treatment
The Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment only in the ranking rule used
for the waiting list. In this treatment, the default option for the donation decision was not to be
an organ donor. Before making the donation decision, all subjects were informed that those who
chose to be an organ donor would be given priority ranking on the waiting list. Therefore,
12

subjects on the waiting list in this treatment were ranked on the basis of two criteria: first their
donation decision, and second the length of time they had been waiting on the list. For example,
if subject 1 is a non-donor who had been waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 is a registered donor
who had been waiting for 3 periods, subject 2 ranked higher than subject 1.
Opt-out with Priority Treatment
The Opt-out with Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment in both the
default option and the ranking rule on the waiting list. In this treatment, subjects were registered
organ donors by default. Before making the donation decision, all subjects were informed that
those who withdraw their donor registration would automatically give up their priority ranking
on the waiting list. Transplantable organs would be provided to registered donors before nondonors.
The description of the decision environment to the subjects in the four treatments above was
stated in terms of organ donations.

We conducted an additional treatment, in which the

instructions to subjects were neutrally-framed, to control the effect of the experiment framing.
Neutral Treatment
In the Neutral treatment, we adopted the same default option and ranking rule on the waiting
list as the Control treatment. The only difference is that the experiment description was phrased
in abstract terms, not in terms of organs. Subjects were informed that they would be assigned
three tokens in each round: one A token and two B tokens. In each period, each subject had a 10%
probability of losing their A token and a 20% probability of losing both B tokens. Subjects
would earn $3 in each period that they had one A token and at least one B token. The donation
decision in this treatment was described as follows:
“In this round, you are not a donor by default. If you want to change
your status to be a donor, please check the box below; otherwise,
please leave it empty.

□ I hereby agree to donate my B tokens after I cease to participate in
this round.”
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We conducted eighteen experimental sessions with 15 subjects in each session. In twelve
sessions, subjects played 15 rounds in one of the organ-framed treatments followed by 15 rounds
of another one of the organ-framed treatments (for example, subjects participated in the Control
treatment for rounds 1-15 and then the Opt-out treatment for rounds 16-30). In these sessions,
subjects were stopped after round 15 and told that they would start a new treatment. Subjects
were handed the instruction of the new treatment and the experimenter clearly explained all
changes in the rules.
In three of the remaining sessions, subjects played the Control treatment in all 30 rounds,
while in the last three treatments subjects played the neutral treatment in all 30 rounds. In these
sessions, subjects were also stopped after round 15. They were told that they would start a new
treatment, but there were no changes in the rules of the game. The experimenter reviewed all the
rules of the game. All types of treatment combination are shown in Table 2. Lastly, the
selection of which session to conduct among the eighteen sessions was randomly determined.
[Insert Table 2 here]
At the end of each session, the subjects were presented with a brief questionnaire on their
demographic characteristics and their involvement with organ donation in their own lives. They
received payment after they completed the questionnaire.

III. Results
The experiment was performed at the Georgia State University Experimental Economics Center
(ExCEN). Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student body using a recruiting
program that randomly invites registered subjects to participate in the experiment. A total of 270
subjects participated in the experiment and the average payment was $18.03.14 Table 3 presents
the descriptive statistics for the experiment. There are 8100 observations at the subject-round
level. The average donation registration rate for all treatments is 41.5%. The average donation
rates by treatment were as follows: Opt-out with Priority (70.8%), Priority (61.3%), Opt-out
(48.8%), Control (25.3%), and Neutral (17.8%). The descriptive statistics clearly indicate that
14

The experiment was conducted using the experimental software z-Tree 3.3.6 (Fishbacher 2007).
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the highest average donation rates arise when the priority rule is utilized. This finding is
consistent with that of Kessler and Roth (2012), but the descriptive statistics also illustrate that
substantial gains can be achieved using just an opt-out policy.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Figure 2 shows the percentage of subjects who were registered organ donors (those who
either opted in or did not opt out) in each round of the experiment for each treatment. The line
breaks indicate that subjects were stopped after round 15 in each session and restarted a new
treatment from round 16 through 30. Figure 2 suggests that changing the default option and/or
altering the organ allocation rule has a significant positive impact on the donor registration rate
across all 30 rounds. The Control treatment lies beneath the three other organ-framed treatments
regardless of being played in the first or last 15 rounds.
experiment framing plays an important role.

Figure 2 also suggests that the

The organ-framed treatment generates higher

average donation registration rate than the neutral-framed treatment.

This difference in

registration rate across treatment is even more notable in the last 15 rounds.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
To more rigorously investigate the treatment differences a series of Wilcoxon rank sum tests
were conducted comparing the donation decisions of subjects across treatments. The results
from these tests are illustrated in Table 4. The test statics are conducted using three different
data partitions. The first pools all of the data across rounds, the second focuses on the first 15
rounds in the experiment and the third partition is for the last 15 rounds. The results from all of
the Wilcoxon rank sum tests clearly indicate that the donation decisions across treatments are
statistically different from one another. They are also consistent with the observation that the
donation rate is highest in the Opt-out with Priority treatment and the lowest is the Neutral
treatment.
[Insert Table 4 here]
We additionally conducted a series of probit regressions to investigate the marginal effect of
different mechanisms on organ donation decisions. The results are illustrated in Table 5. The
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independent variables in the probit regressions include four treatment dummy variables Opt-out,
Priority, Opt-out/priority, and Neutral corresponding with the different cells of the experimental
design (Model 1). The reference group is the donation decision in the Control treatment, which
is the opt-in system currently used in the U.S. We further control whether a decision is made in
the first 15 rounds or in last 15 rounds of the experiment using a dummy variable interaction
term (Model 2). The dummy variable Second Treatment equals to 1 if a treatment is played in
the last 15 rounds and it is interacted with the four primary treatment dummies in Model 1.
Regression Models 3 and 4 control for the effect of information in the previous round on the
donor registration decision. Earnings Last Round represents earnings from the previous round
(Model 3). Received an Organ Last Round is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the subject
received an organ donated by others in the previous round. Benefit of Organ Received Last
Round captures the earnings from the previous round after receiving an organ (Model 4). Lastly,
regression Model 5 includes demographic control variables Male, White, and Donor in Real Life.
The following of this section provides more detailed results from the experiment broken down by
our five primary research hypotheses.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Focusing on our first research hypothesis the results for the experiment validate our
hypothesis that the opt-out rule generates a higher donor registration rate than the opt-in rule.
Figure 2 illustrates that the opt-out rule has a significant positive impact on the donor registration
rate in all rounds. Across all rounds, the Opt-out treatment has an average donation rate of
48.8%, which is almost twice the average donation rate of 25.3% in the Control treatment. Over
the first 15 rounds, the Opt-out treatment had an average donation rate of 53.8%, while the
Control treatment had a much lower average rate of 27.7%. Over rounds 16-30, the Opt-out
treatment had a rate of 43.9%, while the Control treatment only had a rate of 22.9%. Results
from the non-parametric tests in Table 4 are consistent with the observation that the Control
treatment had a statistically significant lower donor registration rate than the Opt-out treatment
regardless of being played in the first or last 15 rounds. The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are 14.988, -11.493 and -9.713 for pooled data, first 15 rounds and last 15 rounds of the experiment
respectively when comparing the Control treatment with the Opt-out treatment.
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The probit regressions in Table 5 also support our first research hypothesis. The positive and
highly statistically significant coefficient on the Opt-out dummy variable in regression Model 1
indicates that subjects are about 25% more likely to register as a donor in the Opt-out treatment
than in the Control treatment across all 30 rounds. Furthermore, this finding is robust to the
additional controls used in the other econometric specifications (Models 2 through 5). This
represents an almost 100% increase in the donor registration rate over the 25.3% donor
registration rate observed in the Control treatment. This finding suggests a significant increase in
donation rate can be achieved by just introducing the opt-out rule.
In order to test our second research hypothesis we must compare the Control treatment (the
baseline opt-in without priority system) with the Priority treatment as well as the Opt-out
treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment. A statistically significant and higher donor
registration rate for the Priority and Opt-out with Priority treatments will support our second
research hypothesis. Figure 2 illustrate that the Priority treatment has a higher average donation
registration rate than the Control treatment in all rounds. The average donation rate for the
Priority treatment is 61.3% over all rounds, 59.6% over the first 15 rounds, and 63.0% over the
last 15 rounds. A higher donation rate is also observed in the Opt-out with Priority treatment
when compared to the Opt-out treatment. The average donation rate for this treatment was 70.8%
over all rounds, 73.2% for the first 15 rounds and 68.4% for last 15 rounds.
The Wilcoxon rank sum tests also demonstrate that the Control treatment generates
statistically significantly lower donation registration rates than the Priority treatment over all
rounds as well as in rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 separately. The test statistics are -22.309, 13.895, and -17.680 when comparing the Control treatment with the Priority treatment for all the
rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively. The results comparing the Opt-out treatment
with the Opt-out with Priority treatment are similar to those observed when comparing the
Control treatment with the Priority treatment, adding the priority allocation rule increases the
rate of organ donation. The Wilcoxon rank sum test statistics are -11.656, -7.402 and -9.102
when comparing the total rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively. This said, the
marginal differences between the Opt-out treatment and the Opt-out with Priority treatment are
not as large as when comparing the Control treatment with the Priority treatment since the donor
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registration rate increased only 45% whereas it increased by 142% when comparing the Control
treatment with the Priority treatment.
The probit results also illustrate the treatment differences as the statistically significant and
positive coefficient on Priority indicates that the donation rate increases by between 31.5% and
36.5%, depending on the model assumptions.

The statistically significant and positive

coefficient on Opt-out with Priority indicates that the donation rate increases by between 42.8%
and 45.1%, depending on the model assumptions. Both of these coefficients are interpreted
relative to the Control treatment so the relative gains observed under the Opt-out with Priority
treatment must be purged of the Opt-out effect solely to be comparable to the Control versus
Priority treatment. Both of these results are consistent with those observed in Kessler and Roth
(2012) as it is clearly evident that changing the allocation rule to a priority rule will increase the
donor registration rate. This said, these comparisons do raise the question of whether or not just
using the rule Opt-out is capable of providing a similar gain as that observed when altering the
allocation rule. This is more formally investigated under our third research hypothesis.
Our previous research hypotheses have illustrated that altering either the organ allocation rule,
using a priority rule system, or the default choice, going from an Opt-in to an Opt-out program,
will increase the organ donor registration rate. The results from our Wilcoxon sign rank tests as
well as the probit regressions clearly indicate that the organ donation rate is greater when
comparing either the Opt-out treatment or the Priority treatment with the Control (opt-in)
treatment. From a public policy perspective it may be of interest whether or not the relative
gains are comparable, as both policies require different forms of administrative change that may
or may not be more palatable for different administrations and the populous. On average going
from the Control treatment to the Opt-out treatment increased the organ donation rate from 25.3%
to 48.8% whereas going to the Priority treatment increased it to 61.3%. This provides the first
evidence that does not support our third research hypothesis that they generate equivalent
marginal gains in the organ donor rate. Our regression results further confirm this observation.
Comparing the coefficient on the Opt-out treatment with the Priority treatment illustrates that in
all the models estimated the Priority treatment coefficient is statistically significant and greater
than the Opt-out treatment coefficient (p<0.01). Therefore, our third research is not supported.
However, it is important to note that changing the default choice, going from an Opt-in to an
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Opt-out system, is able to generate approximately 80% of the gains achievable when altering the
allocation rule. Therefore, although it is not a 1-to-1 equivalent the gains are significant enough
that policy makers may wish to consider changing just the default option versus the allocation
rule if default option is a more palatable public policy.
Investigating our third research hypothesis illustrated that sizable gains are achievable by
changing either the allocation rule or the default choice, with the allocation rule outperforming
the default choice by a small margin. Our fourth research hypothesis investigates whether or not
using either of these changes in isolation yields the same result as combining them and utilizing
an Opt-out with Priority program.

Figure 2 clearly illustrates that Opt-out with Priority

treatment outperforms both the Opt-out treatment and the Priority treatment separately, as it
generated the highest donation rate of all the treatments. This does not support our fourth
research hypothesis, as it is clear that combining both changes exceeds either of them individual.
Overall all the rounds the average donation rate was 70.8% for the Opt-out with Priority
treatment, compared with 48.8% and 61.3% observed under the Opt-out and Priority treatments
respectively. This is also true when comparing the results from rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30.
Over the first 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate of
73.2%, while the Opt-out treatment was 53.8% and the Priority treatment was 59.6%. Over the
last 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate of 68.4% while
the Opt-out treatment was 43.9% and the Priority treatment was 63.0%.
The non-parametric test indicates that the Opt-out with Priority treatment outperforms all the
other treatments and that the results are statistically significant. It also shows that the Opt-out
with Priority treatment generates statistically significantly higher donation registration rates than
all the other treatments no matter if played first (rounds 1-15) or last (rounds 16-30). The test
statistics comparing the Opt-out treatment and the Priority treatment with the Opt-out with
Priority treatment concretely invalidates our fourth research hypothesis, as it evident that in all
cases the combined effect of the Opt-out with Priority treatment exceeds the constituent changes
separately. Results from the parametric tests in Table 5 are also consistent with this observation.
The coefficient on Opt-out/priority in regression (1) is positive and highly statistically significant,
representing that subjects are about 45% more likely to donate in the Opt-out with Priority
treatment than in the Control treatment. Using estimates from regression (1), we find that Opt19

out/priority also performs better than either Opt-out (p<0.01) or Priority (p<0.01) treatments
separately.
As mentioned earlier, our experiment is fundamentally different from Kessler and Roth’s
(2012) experiment as it investigates the separable and combined effects of changing the
allocation rule as well as the default option and it contextualizes the decision environment. Our
fifth and final research hypothesis investigates whether or not the abstract and contextual
framing generate the same donor registration rates.

Our experimental results indicate that the

contextual framing leads to a larger donor registration rate than a neutral framing. Evidence of
this can be seen in Figure 2, where the neutral framing donation rates are on average lower than
those observed in the contextual framing treatment. However, the differences are not as clear
over rounds 1-15 as they are over rounds 16-30.
The Wilcoxon rank sum tests and the probit regression results clarify this treatment effect.
The non-parametric tests demonstrate that the Control treatment generates statistically
significantly higher donation registration rates than the Neutral treatment. This result is still
statistically significant for all rounds and if we only focus on the first 15 rounds or the last 15
round; the test statistics are 5.376, 2.362 and 5.431 for the respective partitions of the data. The
parametric tests estimate the likelihood of donation in each treatment. The significant negative
coefficient on Neutral in regression Model 1 indicates that subjects are about 10% less likely to
register as a donor in the neutral-framed treatment than in the organ-framed treatment across all
30 rounds. When controlling for other covariates in the experiment, Models 2 through 5, this
percentage decreases to around 5%. Therefore using a neutral framing, as was conducted by
Kessler and Roth (2012), will generate a lower rate of donor registration.
Robustness of Results
Table 5 also report results from probit regressions with controls for order effects, information
of the previous round and demographic dummies. Results are qualitatively the same when we
add additional controls. Regression (2) includes a control variable Second Treatment and its
interactions with the treatment variables.

The significant negative coefficient on Second

Treatment shows that subjects are 6% less likely to register when they played the Control
treatment in the last 15 rounds. The significant positive coefficient on the interaction term
20

Second Treatment*Priority indicate that the Priority treatment has an even stronger impact on
the registration rate when it was played after subjects have participated in another organ-framed
treatment.
Regression (3) controls for the effect of earnings in the previous round on donation
registration. The significant positive coefficient on Earnings Last Round suggests earnings in
the previous round have a positive impact on the donation decision. Although subjects played
multiple rounds in the experiment, only one round was randomly selected for payment at the end
of each session. Subjects’ donation decision should not be affected by their previous earnings.
However, subjects could get information about others’ donation decision through receiving a B
organ when needed in a previous period of the experiment. We further included variables
Received an Organ Last round and Benefit of Organ Received Last Round in regression (4). The
significant positive coefficient on Received an Organ Last Round shows that subjects are 5%
more likely to donate if they received a B organ in previous round. Since receiving a B organ
leads to additional earnings, earnings of the previous round, especially earnings after receiving a
B organ, affect the likelihood of donation (Received an Organ Last Round and Benefit of Organ
Received Last Round are positive and significant at 10% level). Regression (5) controls for
demographic information of the subjects. Among our selected subjects, whites are 8% more
likely to register as a donor than all non-white races. Subjects who were self-reported as organ
donor in real life are 5% more like to register as a donor. These two results are statistically
significant.

IV. Conclusion
A fundamental limitation of the success of transplantation-based medical treatments is the supply
of organs. Although there have been sizeable gains in the development of immunosuppressant
drugs that have increased the pool of potential candidates for a donated organ, there still exists an
ever widening gap between the number of organ donors and the number of patients on the
waiting list. Recently, the transplantation community has made sizable gains in the utilization of
donated organs (Howard et al., 2007; Shafer et al., 2008), but future changes in public policy
may be required to increase the rate of organ donation within the United States in order to save
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more lives. Drawing from the experiences in other countries, changes in public policy can arise
from either changing the allocation rule to provide priority for those who are registered donors or
from changing the default choice from a standard opt-in to an opt-out system. Furthermore, as is
the case in Singapore, it is possible to combine both changes in the allocation rule and default
choice. The results from our experiment provide the first rigorous investigation of changing both
the allocation rules and default choice separately as well as jointly.
Our results are consistent with those previously observed in Kessler and Roth (2012), in that
changing the allocation rule to a priority rule system yields a sizable increase in the organ
donation rate. We further extend this finding to illustrate that the priority rule generates a larger
marginal gain than altering the default choice from an opt-in to an opt-out public policy. In
addition, we find that combining both an opt-out and priority rule policy will provide the largest
gains in the organ donation rate and that gains are substantially different from the individual
effect of each public policy change. We further find evidence that the context of the experiment
used to investigate the organ donation decision does matter with a contextualized decision
environment yielding an increase in organ donation rates of around 5%.
An important public policy finding is that our results illustrate that approximately 80% of the
gains observed under a priority allocation rule are achievable by switching from an opt-in to an
opt-out public policy. This is extremely important from a public policy perspective as the costs,
both pecuniary and psychological, associated these two possible changes may be substantially
different. A change in the allocation rule redefines the rules of whom is to receive priority for an
organ which post-transplantation may invoke concepts of fairness and equality as enforcement of
this rule may still rely on the deceased donors next-of-kin being amenable to their deceased’s
donation preferences. On the other hand, an opt-out policy redefines the rule of who owns a
deceased’s individuals organs from the next-of-kin to the government. The choice of which
option is more appropriate is subject to the policy maker’s discretion and the constituents that
they represent.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Two-by-Two Experimental Design
Opt-in

Opt-out

Without Priority Rule

Control Treatment

Opt-out Treatment

With Priority Rule

Priority Treatment

Opt-out with Priority
Treatment

Table 2: Number of sessions for each treatment combination
Treatment Rounds
1-15

Treatment Rounds 16-30

Control

Opt-out

Priority

Opt-out with
Priority

Neutral

Control

3 Sessions

1 Session

1 Session

1 Session

No Sessions

Opt-out

1 Session

No Sessions

1 Session

1 Session

No Sessions

Priority

1 Session

1 Session

No Sessions

1 Session

No Sessions

Opt-out with
Priority

1 Session

1 Session

1 Session

No Sessions

No Sessions

Neutral

No Sessions

No Sessions

No Sessions

No Sessions

3 Sessions
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the experiment

Variable
Round Profit
Round Cost
Payment
Flier
Donation Registration Rate

Obs
8100
8100
8100
8100
8100

Mean
9.216
0.582
18.033
0.211
0.415

Std.
Dev.
9.83
0.90
9.28
0.41
0.49

Min
-3
0
7
0
0

Max
87
3
63.25
1
1

Control Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

2700

0.253

0.43

0

1

Opt-out Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.488

0.50

0

1

Priority Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.613

0.49

0

1

Opt-out with Priority Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.708

0.45

0

1

Neutral Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.178

0.38

0

1
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Table 4: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests

Pooled Data
Treatment

Rounds 1-15

Treatment

Test
Statistic

Treatment

Rounds 16-30

Treatment

Test
Statistic

Treatment

Treatment

Test
Statistic

Control

vs

Opt-out

-14.988***

Control

vs

Opt-out

-11.493***

Control

vs

Opt-out

-9.713***

Control

vs

Priority

-22.309***

Control

vs

Priority

-13.895***

Control

vs

Priority

-17.680***

Control

vs

Opt-out with
Priority

-27.818***

Control

vs

Opt-out with
Priority

-19.491***

Control

vs

Opt-out with
Priority

-19.897***

Control

vs

Neutral

5.376***

Control

vs

Neutral

2.362**

Control

vs

Neutral

5.431***

Opt-out

vs

Priority

-6.498***

Opt-out

vs

Priority

-2.141**

Opt-out

vs

Priority

-7.036***

Opt-out

vs

-11.656***

Opt-out

vs

-7.402***

Opt-out

vs

Priority

vs

-5.241***

Priority

vs

-5.298***

Priority

vs

Opt-out with
Priority
Opt-out with
Priority

Opt-out with
Priority
Opt-out with
Priority

Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level.
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Opt-out with
Priority
Opt-out with
Priority

-9.102***
-2.121**

Table 5: Probit regression on the decision to be a donor or not within the experiment; all
variables are expressed as marginal values.

Opt-out
Priority
Opt-out/priority
Neutral

Probit Estimation
(1)
(2)
0.249***
0.269***
(0.016)
(0.023)
0.365***
0.323***
(0.015)
(0.022)
0.451***
0.450***
(0.014)
(0.020)
-0.098***
-0.058**
(0.017)
(0.024)

(3)
0.258***
(0.024)
0.322***
(0.023)
0.437***
(0.021)
-0.055**
(0.025)

(4)
0.248***
(0.024)
0.311***
(0.023)
0.428***
(0.021)
-0.055**
(0.025)

(5)
0.252***
(0.024)
0.315***
(0.023)
0.431***
(0.021)
-0.052**
(0.025)

-0.058***
(0.020)
-0.038
(0.033)
0.094***
(0.035)
0.005
(0.035)
-0.091**
(0.035)

-0.062***
(0.021)
-0.030
(0.033)
0.092***
(0.035)
0.014
(0.035)
-0.093**
(0.035)

-0.062***
(0.021)
-0.029
(0.033)
0.090***
(0.035)
0.010
(0.035)
-0.088**
(0.036)

-0.065***
(0.021)
-0.023
(0.034)
0.100***
(0.036)
0.014
(0.036)
-0.085**
(0.036)

0.003***
(0.001)

0.001*
(0.001)
0.047**
(0.021)
0.003*
(0.001)

0.001*
(0.001)
0.047**
(0.021)
0.003*
(0.001)

Second Treatment
Second Treatment*Opt-out
Second Treatment*Priority
Second Treatment*Opt-out/priority
Second Treatment*Neutral

Earnings Last Round
Received an Organ Last Round
Benefit of Organ Received Last Round

Male

0.011
(0.012)
0.076***
(0.019)
0.050***
(0.012)

White
Donor in Real Life

N
Chi2
Pseudo R2

8100
1375.02
0.1250
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8100
1425.66
0.1297

7830
1388.24
0.1306

7830
1416.61
0.1333

7801
1466.78
0.1385

Figure 1: Illustration of the decision screen used in the experiment

Figure 2: Percentage of donors in each treatment reported by round of the experiment.
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Appendix A: Experimental Parameters
Given the complexity of the decision environment we elected to simulate the decision
environment to inform our parameterization of the experiment. The most critical parameter in
our experiment is the probability of organ failure. There are two types of organ failure in our
experiment. Subjects with an A organ failure potentially provide transplantable organs for
subjects with a B organ failure. The ratio of the probability of B organ failure to the probability
of A organ failure should be high enough to keep the scarcity of transplantable organs high, but it
also cannot be too high because it will cancel out the incentive to donate in the Priority treatment.
Figure A.1 shows the expected payoff difference between donors and non-donors for different
parameter values in both the Control treatment and the Priority treatment (based on 100,000
simulations of donation rate from 0% to 100% for each set of parameters). The parameter values
vary the ratio of the probability of B organ failure to the probability of A organ failure (Beta in
Figure A.1).
In Figure A.1, the teal blue line represents the expected payoff difference with the parameters
actually used in the experiment (Beta=2), consistent with those used by Kessler and Roth (2012).
In the Control treatment, being a donor is more costly that being a non-donor, which would
predict no donation in the game. Non-zero donation in the Control treatment would be the
expression of altruistic motivation. In the Priority treatment, the payoff difference is increasing
with the donation rate. It is worth noting that once Beta exceeds two the payoff difference start
to fall off again and the benefits of being a donor are reduced. The reason for these results is an
increase in Beta generates an overwhelming gap between organ demand and supply. Due to the
high odds of having a B organ failure and the insufficient organ supply, the probability of dying
while waiting for a B organ increases even for donors who have priority on the waiting list. The
incentive to donate provided by priority rule is canceled out, since having priority on the waiting
list does not generate benefit any more.
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Figure A.1: Simulations payoff difference between being a donor and a non-donor for both the
Control treatment (left panel) and Priority the treatment (right panel) while varying the
percentage of donors (x-axis) as well as the ratio of the A organ failure to B organ failure (Beta).

Control Treatment

Priority Treatment

FIGURE 2. SIMULATION RESULTS ACROSS PARAMETER SELECTION
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